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Commentary: A Blueprint for Change in  the  Northwest  Territories? 
September  1992 marks the 25th anniversary of moving the Government of the Northwest Territories 
(GNWT) from Ottawa to Yellowknife. In  that time, the growth of the territorial governmental process has 
been phenomenal. In 1967, most GNWT employees travelled in one  plane going to Yellowknife, and the 
government’s budget was about $14 million. Today, there are almost 6000 GNWT employees and the bud- 
get is over $1.1 billion. Strength at Two Levels’ (the Beatty Report) is certainly one of the more interesting 
and contentious reports commissioned by the  GNWT.  On the one hand it advocates expanding the powers 
of local governments in the region - hence, strength at the territorial and local levels of government. At 
the same time, if implemented, recommendations of the report would undermine part of the GNWT’s 
power base in Yellowknife. The question then  is: Will the report become a blueprint for change, or will it 
be just another document for decentralization, unheeded by Yellowknife? 
The Beatty Report is about the high cost of government in the Northwest Territories (NWT). Its origins 
are  rooted  in  two  problems.  One is a northern  dilemma. The North  has a severe  economic  problem.  Unemploy- 
ment, particularly in small communities, is more  than twice the national average, and average income per 
capita is almost half the national average. For years, government’s response to low economic development 
in the North has been to establish a safety net modelled on social welfare programs originating in  the South. 
The cost of services and programs is increasing rapidly, while increases to the GNWT’s public revenue 
base are declining. Michael Ballantyne, former finance minister and chairman of the Financial Management 
Board (FMB), put it succinctly in  his letter transmitting the Beatty Report to the present chairman of the 
FMB of the 12th Legislative Assembly (elected in October 1991): “The cost of providing basic government 
service to the people of the NWT far exceeds the NWT’s revenue raising capacity” (p. 1). 
A second problem is reflected in a northern paradox. The government’s safety net was provided by 
Ottawa and later, as powers were devolved to the GNWT, by the bureaucracy in Yellowknife. Programs 
and services include, for example, education, health care, housing, social services and economic develop- 
ment. In spite of these expensive programs and services, many people resent the centralized, bureaucratic 
delivery mechanism. Many individuals feel it is an intrusion into their lives and  that  they do not have con- 
trol of their own destinies. Moreover, many feel that the process has created a kind of dependency in the 
North, to the extent that people look to government as the solution to their economic problems. Therefore 
the GNWT’s FMB, in January 1991, commissioned the study to determine if “government effectiveness 
could be increased and if costs could be contained without large declines in service to the public” (p. 1). 
The project director was Garry H. Beatty, who had  worked as deputy minister of Finance and secretary 
of the Treasury Board in Saskatchewan, president of the Crown Investments Corporation in that province, 
and president and CEO of Manitoba Hydro. Project members included five senior staff from the GNWT, 
one former GNWT assistant deputy minister, one person from the Baffin Divisional Board of Education, 
one from the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, one Native chief, one person seconded from the federal 
Department of Western Economic Diversification and  two outside consultants with extensive experience 
working in the public sector. Their group’s task was to recommend to the FMB of the 12th Legislative 
Assembly how  it could reduce “the rate of expenditure growth to match the revenues that will  be available 
in the future” (p. 2). 
The problem is that 56 000 NWT residents are over-governed; a province-like territorial government has 
the highest cost per capita of any jurisdiction in Canada. A number of facts and figures point to examples of 
excessive government. In the 64 communities throughout the NWT the “GNWT operates 375 programs 
delivered through 17 departments of government” (p. 21). There are 1500 elected politicians and some 800 
statutory and other GNWT-sponsored bodies. In the non-taxed base communities, about 320 special-pur- 
pose bodies cost approximately $66 million a ye&. “At the regional level there are regional and tribal coun- 
cils, health, wildlife and educational boards and aboriginal organizations” (p. 92). Housing costs and subsi- 
dies alone amount to about $130 million a year, or approximately 12% of the territorial budget. Including 
all levels of government, there are over 9000 public employees, almost half of the total labour force in the 
NWT. All of this represents a vast network of government in the NWT, and the task for the project mem- 
bers  was to determine how it might be simplified and made more efficient. 
The project group suggested two types of changes  for reorganizing the GNWT: decentralization of 
responsibilities and consolidation of structures and programs. Decentralization of responsibility was needed 
because “Community governments are under-used in the north” (p. 17). The idea was that a community 
infrastructure existed but it did not have the power to act on problems inherent to the community. For 
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example, local government powers included water, sewers, streets, lighting, airports, fire protection, town 
planning, garbage collection and recreation. It was suggested that by the year 2000 local responsibilities 
include day care, economic development, housing, drug and alcohol treatment, welfare, schools (including 
adult education) and crisis shelters (p. 42). With these powers, community governments could be in the 
“forefront” of solving community problems (p. 43). 
The problem was moving more “program authority and resources” to community governments (p. 46). 
To  do this, the GNWT over time should enter into transfer agreements with communities, including multi- 
year block funding to enable them  to carry out their new responsibilities. Negotiations would  be on a com- 
munity-to-community basis, the extent of the transfers being up to communities. An implementation group 
would  be established, reporting to Cabinet, to carry out the transfer agreements. Thus, within 10-15 years, 
communities might have full responsibility for housing, buildings and public works, social welfare, educa- 
tion and the production and marketing of country foods. Community governments could carry out the 
responsibilities more efficiently than could a centralized agency in Yellowknife. 
Consolidating responsibilities of the territorial government was also an integral part of the project 
group’s recommendations. Effective performance by departments and agencies was encumbered by layers 
of management. For example, in 1985 there were 14 deputy ministers and 15 assistant deputy ministers; in 
1990 there were 18 deputy ministers and  27 assistant deputy ministers (p. 84). In addition, “There are now 
too many departments, which is a major barrier to integrating and transferring programs to communities. 
Departments are pursuing too many different and sometimes conflicting directions” (p. 61). The existing 
GNWT administration would  be collapsed into eight functional departments, and a number of boards, agen- 
cies and third party organizations would  be reorganized and decentralized, the rationale being to  make ser- 
vice agencies more efficient and  more effective. 
The Beatty Report provided an impetus for change in the NWT.  In February 1992, the GNWT tabled its 
general outline for “Reshaping Northern Government.” It noted  that  any new government design in the ter- 
ritory would take into account the  Beatty recommendations, as well as from members and committees of 
the Legislative Assembly, from aboriginal and special interest groups and from the general public. In June 
1992, the GNWT made  more specific proposals, recommending some consolidation and some decentraliza- 
tion of administrative organizations. In a statement to the Legislature on 16 June, the government leader 
outlined the game plan. For example, the departments of Government Services and Public Works would  be 
merged, as would  the departments of Culture and Communications and Education. 
In the same statement, a decentralization program was also announced. It  was designed in part to assist 
those centres affected by the “sluggish” economy and budget reductions. It included, for example, the fol- 
lowing moves: airport and transportation programs to Fort Simpson, Norman Wells and Baker Lake; the 
head office and administration of Arctic College to Iqaluit and  Fort Smith; parts of health care administra- 
tion  to Inuvik and Rankin Inlet; the Science Institute headquarters to one of its research facilities; and the 
Highways Transport Board  and Public Utilities Board to Hay River. The above changes represent consoli- 
dation and decentralization of administration. Changes in decision-making responsibilities at the commu- 
nity level have not occurred. Therefore it may  be premature to assess the full impact of the Beatty Report. 
The Beatty Report is not the only design for change on the table  in the North. Since November 1991, the 
NWT has moved a step closer to division, and the establishment of Nunavut is highly probable. The direct 
governing of their own lands by the Inuit would certainly necessitate restructuring northern government. In 
the western Northwest Territories the Commission for Constitutional development issued its report in April 
1992, “Working Toward a Common Future.” It posed the possibility of. a new constitutional process for the 
new territory, emphasizing the necessity of beginning authority relationships with people and communities. 
Its design would certainly restructure the governmental process in the  NWT. 
Thus the dominant view circulating in the NWT seems to be that change is required in northern govern- 
ment. Twenty-five years of evolution have created a centralized, cumbersome and expensive territorial gov- 
ernment centred in Yellowknife. Many individuals and groups outside Yellowknife want a greater say  in 
the policy-making process. A number of ideas exist about how the present system should be changed. The 
Beatty Report is one of those ideas, but one upon  which the GNWT is relying heavily. Pressures on mem- 
bers of the Legislative-Assembly may force the government to incorporate a number of views in its plans 
for restructuring. But the question remains, will the GNWT actually embark on a process of change, where 
communities or regions actually have greater decision-making powers? This may  be difficult for a govern- 
ment that has built up a great deal of inertia over 25 years. 
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